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Abstract
What is the role of the imagination in scientific practice? Here I focus on the nature and role
of invitations to imagine in certain scientific texts as represented by the example of Einstein’s
Special Relativity paper from 1905. Drawing on related discussions in aesthetics, I argue, on
the one hand, that this role cannot be simply subsumed under ‘supposition’ but that, on the
other, concerns about the impact of genre and symbolism can be dealt with, and hence
present no obstacle to regarding imagination as appropriately belief-like. By applying the
framework of ‘semi- propositional representations’ and ‘quasi-truth’ to this case I thereby
offer a new unitary framework for understanding the epistemology of scientific imagination.
Keywords Imagination . Supposition . Scientific practice . Symbolism . Semi-
propositional representation . Quasi-truth
1 Introduction: Einstein’s Invitation
Consider the following passage, taken from Einstein’s classic paper, ‘On the Electro-
dynamics of Moving Bodies’ (Einstein 1905):
“Let there be given a stationary rigid rod; and let its length be l as measured by a
measuring-rod which is also stationary. We now imagine the axis of the rod lying
along the axis of x of the stationary system of co-ordinates, and that a uniformmotion
of parallel translation with velocity v along the axis of x in the direction of increasing x
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is then imparted to the rod. We now inquire as to the length of the moving rod, and
imagine its length to be ascertained by the following two operations ...”
The passage continues,
“We imagine further that at the two ends A and B of the rod, clocks are placed
which synchronize with the clocks of the stationary system, that is to say that
their indications correspond at any instant to the “time of the stationary system” at
the places where they happen to be. These clocks are therefore “synchronous in
the stationary system.” ...
We imagine further that with each clock there is a moving observer, and that
these observers apply to both clocks the criterion established in § 1 for the
synchronization of two clocks.”
Here we appear to have an explicit invitation to engage the imagination and what I’d
like to explore here is the nature of that engagement and its place within this example of
scientific practice. Now, of course, the claim that imagination plays a role in scientific
work is hardly a surprising conclusion but typically that role has been restricted in at
least two senses, both to the heuristic phase of theory development, or what is
sometimes called the ‘discovery’ stage (I’ll come back to this below) and to specific
aspects of scientific practice. Recently, however, those restrictions have begun to relax
in various ways. So, for example, the role of the imagination in thought experiments
and crucially, how that might change our view of the latter, has come under further
examination (Arcangeli 2010; Meynell 2014 and 2018; Murphy forthcoming; Salis and
Frigg forthcoming; Stuart 2017, forthcoming-a and forthcoming-b). And of course, the
view of models as fictions has drawn on the role of the imagination in order to articulate
those fictional aspects (see Frigg 2010; Salis and Frigg forthcoming; Toon 2012).
However, in those cases we are invited to engage the imagination as part of a process of
‘make-believe’ (at least on the most well-known of such accounts), in which we
imagine certain idealised elements of the model – such as the bob in a simple
pendulum, swinging without air resistance – just as we imagine certain elements in a
children’s game of make-believe or in a work of fiction more generally (for a critical
analysis of this sort of account see Weisberg 2013).
In this paper, however, I will look at imagination in what at first sight, at
least, appears to be a different context – namely, that of the presentation of a
theory, via a journal publication (although it could also obviously be in a
seminar or conference presentation or similar). Furthermore, I shall argue
against certain views that might be construed as attempts to diminish the role
of imagination by disassociating it from belief in this context. In doing so, I
shall adopt a framework that takes belief in p to be belief in the quasi-truth of
p, where p is taken to be a ‘semi-propositional representation’ (da Costa and
French 2003). This, I shall claim, opens up space for consideration of imagin-
ing as on a par with other elements of the relevant practice, such as proposing,
entertaining and believing a theory or hypothesis and thus affords a greater
appreciation of its role in that practice.
Before we consider such claims, however, there is a concern that needs to be
dealt with ‘upfront’, as it were, lest it remain a nagging worry throughout the
discussion.
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2 Context
This concern has to do with the fact that Einstein’s original paper was, of course,
written in German and so there might be a worry that the phrase “Wir denken uns nun
die Stabachse ...” although standardly translated as “We now imagine the axis of the
rod …”,1 could be understood as an invitation to simply engage in ‘thinking of’ for
example, rather than as an invitation to imagine, per se.2 However, leaving aside the
issue of why the accuracy of such a widespread and accepted translation should be
doubted or why the translators would insist on using ‘imagine’ in this case when
English alternatives are available, although ‘denken' can indeed be translated as 'think', it is
more appropriately read as 'imagine' when it is in the reflexive form, as it is here. 3Having
said that, there is also a sense in which this concern is a bit of a ‘red herring’. Whatever
Einstein’s own intentions were in writing the original phrase, the English text itself has been
widely reproduced and has had an enormous impact, so I shall take it as my example of an
invitation to imagine in a scientific paper.4
Nevertheless, this offers a convenient point at which to reflect on the nature of imagining
more generally. 5There is, not surprisingly, a huge literature on this and little in the way of
consensus when it comes to an appropriate taxonomy that covers all the different kinds of
imaginings (for a useful overview see Liao and Gendler 2019). For my purposes, it will be
useful to distinguish, at least initially, between sensory or imagistic imagination and
propositional imagination (ibid; see also Arcangeli 2018 who draws the distinction between
‘sensory’ and ‘cognitive’ imagination). The former is concerned with the formation of
mental images in some sensory modality – typically visual – and indeed, such imagery has
historically been taken to be constitutive of imagining (Liao and Gendler op. cit.). 6This
historical force has been resisted, however, and propositional imagination, in which one
represents to oneself that something is the case, does not involve such imagery. The mental
state typically taken to be the counterpart to sensory imagination is perception and the
counterpart to propositional imagination is belief. However, the manner in which imagina-
tion and belief differ is also a matter of debate (again, see Liao and Gendler op. cit.). Both
can be understood as cognitive attitudes involving representation, but some have argued that
the latter but not the former aims for the truth, whereas others have rejected this distinction.
Some have tried to characterise the difference in terms of their connection to action, or lack
thereof. Some have argued that belief and imagination lie on a continuum and still others
maintain that the latter is ultimately reducible to the former. As we’ll see, the framework I
shall offer here blurs, at the very least, the purported distinction in terms of truth and, given
the notion of belief in play, might be read, weakly, as compatible with the continuum view,
1 This is how it is translated in (Einstein 1989) for example, by Anna Beck who translated the first five
volumes of The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, published by Princeton University Press.
2 I’d like to thank Otávio Bueno, Juha Saatsi and an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue.
3 This has been confirmed by various people with the appropriate grasp of German, including a leading expert
in the history and philosophy of space-time theory, to all of whom I am grateful!
4 Nevertheless, the general concern about the legitimacy of translation and interpretation in this context should
not be dismissed. As well as linguistic differences there have also been historical shifts in scientists’ attitudes
towards the imagination (see for example Illife 2018).
5 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.
6 Todd argues that imagery can have important cognitive value because of its connection with certain affective
states that themselves possess cognitive import. Thus, thought experiments, considered via the imagination,
may evoke certain quasisensory intuitions on the basis of which new beliefs can be formed (Todd 2020).
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or more strongly as reductive in nature. Finally, hybrid accounts have also been proposed,
according to which ‘…imaginings have complex contents, only part of which are accounted
for by the contribution of one or more mental images ’ (Langland-Hassan 2015, p. 679). As
we’ll also see, there is a sense in which the imagining that Einstein invites us to engage in
might be regarded as an example of this hybrid form.7
Let us now move on to consider the question, what is involved in accepting such an
invitation to imagine?
3 Instruction and Intention
In formulating an answer to this question, we might draw on other such
invitations, as implicitly made in works of fiction for example. Thus Stock in
her account of fictional content, writes that “... a fiction is a set of instructions
from authors to readers or hearers, instructing them to imagine various things
as part of a single scenario.” (Stock 2017, 174).8
One might be tempted to say, similarly, that ‘A theory is a set of instructions from
scientists to readers or hearers, instructing them to imagine various things ...’ but that
would lead us into a contentious debate over what theories are (see, for example,
French and Vickers 2011; French 2020). Nevertheless, we can regard the presentation
of a theory, or theoretical hypothesis, whether in a talk or in a published paper, as
embodying certain instructions in Stock’s sense and indeed, Einstein does seem to be
giving us, the reader, explicit instructions to imagine here, as when he writes, “We
imagine that at the two ends of the rod a clock is placed ...” The relevant scenario is
obviously the arrangement of rods and clocks and here we are being told to imagine
specific details of this arrangement.
However, one might balk at this importation of a certain understanding of fictions
from the philosophy of art into the philosophy of science. It could be argued that
Einstein’s use of ‘imagine’ in these passages is merely a rhetorical flourish and that his
invitation is actually to entertain a supposition, rather than to imagine per se. If this
were the case, the passage from Einstein’s paper would be much less noteworthy and
our considerations here correspondingly less interesting! Let us then consider this
further distinction that is sometimes made between imagining and supposing.
4 Imagination vs. Supposition
As with imagination, there is a huge literature on the nature of supposition and the
distinction, if any, between the two. Although both may be viewed as similar sorts of
7 Thus referring back to the translation of ‘denken’, it would be too quick to say that ‘thinking’ and
‘imagining’ can be distinguished by virtue of the fact that the latter goes hand in hand with visualisation,
whereas the former does not. Of course if that were the case, it would provide further support for taking what
Einstein wrote as an invitation to imagine since, as we’ll see, it can be understood as involving a sensory
element. Again I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue regarding the distinction between
‘imagining’ and ‘thinking’.
8 Stock defends a position known as ‘extreme intentionalism’ which holds that the content of a work of fiction is
determined by what the author of that work intended the reader to imagine. I do not advocate such a position here.
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mental activity (see Arcangeli (2017) for a useful survey of the various positions in
play), imagination is typically taken to be capable of producing an affect, such as fear
or desire and so on, whereas supposition does not. Supposition on the other hand is
claimed to be relatively unconstrained, whereas imagination is constrained in various
ways – we can suppose contradictions for example but, it is claimed, we cannot
imagine them (see also Salis forthcoming).9 Supposition is also understood to be
‘coarse-grained’ and lacking embellishment, as befits an attitude involved in counter-
factual considerations, whereas imagination is taken to be more detailed and complex.
Thus it might be suggested that what is going on in Einstein’s paper is actually an
invitation to ‘suppose’ rather than imagine per se.
Indeed, it has been argued that conflating supposing and imagining in the scientific
context blurs certain important differences:
‘Theorizing in empirical matters consists in employing something like the
hypothetico-deductive model, whereas imagination does not. Imagination essen-
tially involves forming quasi-sensory mental representations, whereas theorizing
does not. Moreover, [the] view that supposition is a kind of imagination implies
that the cognitive activity in dreaming or daydreaming is different only in degree,
not in kind, from the cognitive activity involved in, say, constructing models in
theoretical physics. This is implausible, though.’ (Spaulding 2016, 220)
The contrast here is with a rather narrow view of ‘theorizing’ and many would accept
that the relevant practices cover a wide range of activities and methodological devices,
that cannot be straightforwardly captured in terms of a hypothetico- deductivist frame-
work. If such practices are taken to include model construction more generally, it is not
so implausible to suggest that what goes on in such construction is only different in
degree from what goes on when a scientist day-dreams, the creative significance of
which is well-known.10 More significantly for what I shall say below, it is also not
obvious that a clear line can be drawn between imagination and what is called
‘theorizing’ above when it comes to the involvement of ‘quasi-sensory mental
representations’.
Certainly, on the face of it, the passages from Einstein’s paper above do reveal an
aspect of his practice that seems to explicitly involve imagination. Granted the previous
considerations about translation, to dismiss this as mere rhetoric might be viewed as a
refusal to take the language used in scientific practice 11 seriously, something we would
do well to avoid.
However, perhaps the crucial argument against drawing a firm distinction between
imagination and supposition is that it leads to an unnecessary multiplication of mental
kinds (cf. Gendler 2000). The view mentioned and dismissed as implausible in the
passage cited above avoids such a cost by taking imagining to embrace supposing.
Thus, Arcangeli (2018) argues that supposition should be regarded as a type of
imagination, but one that is sui generis, standing distinct from both cognitive and
9 The likes of Priest, of course, would disagree (Priest 2006).
10 The exercise of the imagination in day-dreaming is taken to have a spontaneous element but one might
argue that something similar takes place in model building, particularly with regard to its exploratory aspects.
11 I am also taking this broadly, to include the language of texts such as the English translation of Einstein’s paper.
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sensory imagination in terms of its lack of constraint, emotional affect etc. as indicated
above. Supposition, she maintains, is also a propositional attitude and the inferential
relations holding between suppositions are similar to those that hold between beliefs.
However, unlike belief, supposition, by virtue of being a speculative metal state, does
not aim for the truth. Stock, on the other hand, argues that supposition can be regarded
as a form of cognitive imagining but one that has a distinctive role in helping to
determine the identity of the imaginative scenarios in which it features (Stock 2017). As
for the claims that supposition is unconstrained as compared with imagination, or is
coarse grained, affectless and so on, she argues that we should take these apparent
characteristics as merely contingent and contextual features, given certain accompany-
ing purposes, goals & uses (ibid., 202-207; for a critical response see Arcangeli 2017).
Indeed, she suggests, these characteristics have been mistakenly regarded as distinctive
primarily because of the general use of supposition in counterfactual reasoning. It is in
precisely those situations, where the exercise of the imagination tends to be terse,
focussed and lacking in detail, that there is a tendency to refer to it as ‘supposition’.
However, in other contexts, such as we find in fictional works, she maintains, suppo-
sition can be constrained, detailed and accompanied by appropriate emotions.
What about scientific works? Setting to one side the issue of emotional engagement
with aspects of such works (but see Arcangeli and Dokic 2020), supposition is clearly
not entirely unconstrained in this context, given the roles of background knowledge and
assorted heuristic factors (for a classic consideration of the latter see Post 1971). It will
also be more or less fine-grained, depending on the particular features of that scientific
context. These brief considerations suggest that Stock’s context dependent view of
supposition meshes better with scientific practice. Returning to Einstein’s paper, then,
and following her account, we might take the core principles of relativity and constancy
of the velocity of light – clearly constrained by a well-known variety of factors – as
playing a suppositional role in her sense as they effectively delineate the relevant
imaginative scenario – it is within that scenario that we are then invited to imagine the
rods and clocks translated in a certain direction and so on. Indeed, in the context of this
paper, we can see supposition and both cognitive and sensory imagination working
together: having established the relevant scenario via the principles of relativity and
constancy of velocity of light, understood as hypothetical in the appropriate sense, we are
then invited to imagine their counterfactual consequences in terms of a certain scenario
that does indeed involve certain ‘quasi-sensory’ elements insofar as it is articulated in
terms of the familiar elements of clocks and rods (again, I’ll come back to this).
5 Imagination vs. Belief
However, even if one were to concede that a hard and fast distinction between
imagination and supposition is difficult to maintain, one might still insist that imagining
occupies a distinctive role in the presentation and reading of a scientific theory insofar
as it is not ‘belief-like’. Here it is typically maintained that imagining is normally
conscious, voluntary and under our intentional control, whereas belief does not possess
these features. Beliefs also motivate us to take action, whereas imagination does not – it
is ‘quarantined’ (Salis forthcoming). The content of our imagining is also typically
taken to be inhomogeneous in nature and, it has been argued, the ‘imaginative path’
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taken does not necessarily proceed in a ‘belief like’manner (Stock 2017, 177-178); that
is, this path does not proceed via interaction with the usual inferential mechanisms that
govern belief (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Weinberg and Meskin 2006).12
When it comes to fictions, the basis for this last claim is two-fold. First, it is argued
that the genre that such a work falls under will reinforce certain implied but unstated
truths that the reader is encouraged to acknowledge during her reading.
Fictional genres, such as science-fiction, or horror, or crime, are governed (in some
sense) by certain conventions (Stock 2017, pp. 68-74). And these conventions may,
whether explicitly, through the publishers’ blurb on the back of the book, say, or
implicitly, through the reader’s expectations, ‘… hermeneutically reinforce the reader’s
confidence about what fictional truths are implied but unstated in the text.’ (ibid., p.
74). At first glance, at least, such ‘hermeneutic reinforcement’ does not obviously mesh
with the more straightforward ‘inferential pathways’ that one associates with belief.
Furthermore, it is also argued, such imaginings may also incorporate certain sym-
bolic elements that likewise cannot be accommodated via the usual belief related
mechanisms. So, for example, suppose you are reading Jane Eyre and imagine that
Jane is locked in a red room. You may believe that Brontë’s use of a red room here was
intended to symbolize a womb and thus you may then infer that Jane was affected by
the loss of her mother. However, the content of your initial imagining and that of your
belief are not true with regard to the same scenario. The first concerns an orphan girl
and future wife of Rochester while the second has to do with the events – understood as
fictional constructs – of a book written by Brontë. Thus, ‘[t]here is little obvious sense
in which these two kinds of thought, one imaginative and one a belief, come into direct
inferential content: for they take different scenarios as objects (the imaginary scenario
of the novel, and the actual world, respectively).’ (Stock 2017, p. 179).
Now, if imagination could be pulled away from belief in this manner, that would
raise concerns as to whether it could be said to play an integral role in scientific practice
of the sort that we find in Einstein’s paper. It might even encourage the claim that such
invitations to imagine should be dismissed as mere rhetoric.
However, as we’ll now see, by extending a certain formal framework of belief in the
scientific context to accommodate imagining we can better understand its role and by
closer consideration of that context we can overcome the above obstacles to a belief-
like imaginative path.
6 Clocks and Rods and ‘Hooks’
Let us recall: imagining is supposedly not belief-like insofar as it is under our control
and quarantined, its contents are inhomogeneous and the inferential path it takes does
not proceed in an appropriately straightforward manner, due to the intervention of
genre and symbolism.
In response, let us begin with a similar distinction that has been made between belief
and acceptance, as articulated in terms of belief being essentially passive and involun-
tary in nature, whereas acceptance also involves a conscious and voluntary choice
12 Again, these mechanisms may be more varied when it comes to what goes on in science than certain
commentators appreciate.
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(Cohen 1989; see also Elgin 2017 pp. 18-20). Beliefs, it is claimed, come over us
‘willy-nilly’, as it were, whereas acceptance involves an element of commitment.
Likewise, when one imagines, or begins to imagine something, there is a commitment
to the central features of that particular imagining, the consequences of which are then
followed via the ‘imaginative path’ mentioned above. The parallel can be taken to
provide further fuel for the claim that imagination is not ‘belief-like’.
However, when it comes to scientific practice, there are obvious concerns about divorc-
ing acceptance from belief in this manner, not the least of which is that it raises the spectre of
rendering theory choice arbitrary or amatter of convention. One could appeal to the standard
theoretical virtues in response (Schindler 2018) but of course their role in theory choice is
contentious. Ultimately, it would seem, any attempt to assuage the concern must appeal, at
some stage, to the ‘observational element’ of scientific knowledge (Cohen op. cit., p. 386).
But then, granted the much-discussed intricacies of experimentation and observation,
ultimately, again, this does, of course, involve belief. Hence some connection, even if only
indirect, between belief and acceptance can be restored, via this grounding in observation,
albeit mediated. I’ll return to that connection shortly but first let me note that we can draw a
further comparison here with the kinds of invitations to imagine that we find in examples
such as Einstein’s paper.
Here too we can find something akin to these ‘observational elements’, namely the
‘quasi-sensory’ aspects of the imagining noted above. In the case of Einstein’s paper
specifically, we have the clocks and rods with whose behaviour we are expected to be
familiar. The emphasis on these, as in the passages quoted at the beginning of this
paper, has in the past been used to support the view that Einstein, at this stage of his
career, displayed positivistic tendencies, a view that has since been dismissed (see for
example Howard 2017). Nevertheless, the significance, both epistemological and
physical, of the clocks and rods should not be downplayed.
Understood as primitive they imbue the space-time interval with a physical signif-
icance that was carried over into the General Theory, in effect providing gravity-
independent grounds for that theory. Crucially, and fundamentally, Einstein stipulated
the clocks to be ‘perfect’ and the rods as ‘practically rigid’, qualities that the Special
Theory itself ruled out for the corresponding physical entities (Shapere 1969). Thus as
idealised entities these clocks and rods could only be imagined and it is for this reason
that Einstein phrases these passages in this manner.13
It is by virtue of this significance that these elements function as the ‘hooks’ on
which one can hang the ‘belief-like’ features of this particular case of an invitation to
imagine. Of course such hooks may not be and typically will not be present in all cases
of imagining but here I am concerned only with its role in scientific contexts.14
Furthermore, by placing such elements within the imagination, as it were, the reader
is encouraged to consider them as stripped of unnecessary or irrelevant detail, so that
their function can be more readily grasped.15 And as just indicated, that function is to
act as primitive and idealised elements that have a quasi-sensory nature.
13 Sorensen (2013) argues that all idealisations are suppositions and holds that the latter are not belief-like,
since false suppositions – such as idealisations – can still be useful, whereas false beliefs are a different kettle
of epistemic fish. The framework of ‘quasi-truth’ to be presented below embraces both.
14 This is a feature shared with at least some examples of thought experiments; see Murphy forthcoming.
15 Again, a useful comparison might be made with certain thought experiments, such as Newton’s bucket for
example.
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7 Restoring the Connection Between Acceptance and Belief
What, then, is the connection between acceptance and belief when it comes to scientific
theory choice? And how might we appropriate it to render imagination ‘belief-like’?
Here I shall draw on elements of the framework of ‘quasi-‘ or partial- truth as set out in
(da Costa and French 2003).
Thus, underpinning the relevant discussions of belief and acceptance is a common
assumption that belief should be cashed out as belief that p, where p is some propo-
sition, taken to be true. Likewise, this assumption threads through debates over the
nature of (propositional or more broadly, cognitive) imagination and whether it may be
regarded as belief-like. However in both cases, it can be argued that ‘p’ should be taken
to be more complex, less ‘homogeneous’, as open-ended and so on and less directly
tied to the evidence such that ‘belief that p’ is not involuntary and thus distinct from
‘accept that p’ in the manner of the above claim (da Costa and French 2003, Ch. 2).
What is needed, then, is a characterisation of the subject of our beliefs, that is, the ‘p’ in
‘belief that p’, that can accommodate the above features that have been taken to support
the claims that neither acceptance nor imagination is belief-like, as we have seen.
Here we might usefully draw on another example, this time from anthropology:
during his years of field-work in Ethiopia, Sperber encountered an old man who urged
him to kill a dragon that he imagined (crucially) to live not far away. Couched in terms
of propositions that must be regarded as true or false, the man’s belief in the existence
of a dragon might appear irrational. However, Sperber resists such a dismissal and
instead argues that an appropriate epistemic attitude should be adopted but that the
object of such an attitude should not be regarded as strictly propositional in character.
Instead, he suggests, we should replace p above with what he calls a ‘semi-proposi-
tional representation’ (Sperber 1982).
Now, these are 'conceptual representations' that do not have fully fixed propositional
content and may be ‘entertained’, as conceptual possibilities, say. They are generally
not ‘homogeneous’, may even accommodate inconsistencies, and in suggesting a range
of interpretations are heuristically fruitful and open-ended. Thus, Sperber writes that,
' ... a semi-propositional representation can be given as many propositional
interpretations as there are ways of specifying the conceptual content of its
elements. In principle, one of these interpretations is the proper one: it identifies
the proposition to which the semi-propositional representation is intended to
correspond.' (Sperber 1982, 169)
On this basis a further distinction can then be drawn between ‘factual’ beliefs, where
there is awareness only of (what to the subject is) a fact and ‘representational’ beliefs,
where there is awareness of a commitment to a representation. The rationality of
holding the former can be cashed out in terms of evidential support directly involving
observation, whereas that of holding representational beliefs of semi-propositional
content is to be explicated in terms of a warrant that is mediated in certain ways,
including via the beliefs of other epistemic agents (da Costa and French 2003, Ch. 4).
Thus, we may hold a factual belief in the proposition 'the snow is white', where this is
understood as believing that 'the snow is white' is true, in the correspondence sense,
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given the evidence of our senses. And both we and a high energy physicist, say, may
believe, 'representationally', that 'quarks are coloured', given the respective mediations
of the warrant for that belief: for us it may involve our epistemic dependence on, and
trust in, the physicist who asserts such a sentence, whereas for the latter it will embrace
a variety of well-known inter-theoretical and, crucially, theory-evidence relationships
(ibid.). In both cases, the chain of epistemic dependence terminates in a factual belief of
some kind, associated with the relevant evidence. This distinction between factual and
representational beliefs can then be deployed in the context of theory choice, with
Sperber’s notion of a ‘semi-propositional representation’ formalised in terms of partial
structures, taken to represent scientific theories within the framework of the Semantic
Approach (da Costa and French 2003). This can in turn be extended to accommodate
imaginative episodes in scientific practice, as represented by the example of Einstein’s
paper above.
8 Imagination and Quasi-truth
Thus, it has been argued, scientific (theoretical) beliefs in general can be
understood as representational beliefs, in precisely the above sense; that is, in
p as quasi-true, where this latter notion can be formalised à la Tarski via so-
called ‘partial structures’ (ibid.). The formal details are as follows (see da Costa
and French 1990 and, again, 2003):
A partial structure is a set-theoretic construct A = <D, Ri>i∈I, whereD is a non- empty
set and each Ri is a partial relation. A partial relation Ri xover D is a relation which is
not necessarily defined for all n-tuples of elements ofD (see da Costa and French 1990,
p. 255). Each partial relation R can be viewed as an ordered triple <R1, R2, R3>, where
R1, R2, and R3 are mutually disjoint sets, with R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3 = An, and such that: R1 is the
set of n-tuples that (we take to) belong to R; R2 is the set of n- tuples that (we take) do
not belong to R, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not defined whether they
belong or not to R.16
We can then define a notion of quasi-truth (see, again, da Costa and French
2003) as follows: If B is a total structure, whose relations of arity n are defined
for all n-tuples of elements of its universe and the language L of the partial
structure A is also interpreted in B, and P is a set of accepted sentences, then B
is said to be A- normal if:
(i) the universe of B is A;
(ii) the relations of B extend the corresponding partial relations of A;
(iii) if c is an individual constant of L then in both A and B c is interpreted by the same
element;
(iv) if s ∈ P, then B |= s.
16 If we have two such partial structures, partial isomorphisms can be defined between them, allowing us to
capture, it is claimed, both the inter-theoretical and theory-evidence relations mentioned above (Bueno 1997;
French and Ladyman 1999).
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In other words, loosely speaking, a total structure B is called A-normal if it has the same
similarity type as A, its relations extend the corresponding partial relations of A, and the
sentences of P are true, in the Tarskian sense, in B. Then a sentence s is said to be
quasi-true in A, or in the domain D that A partially reflects, if there is an interpretation I
of L (and consequently of s) in an A-normal structure B and s is true in the Tarskian
sense in B. Clearly, A is not conceived of as reflecting the (total) structure of D, but as
only partially mirroring this domain. Thus the partial structure A has to capture some
fundamental aspects of D, or some ‘elements of truth’, although it does not mirror D
perfectly. Then, we can say that s is quasi-true in A, if all logical consequences of s are
compatible with any true primary statement in P. In other words, s is quasi-true in the
partial structure A if there exists an A-normal B in which s is true, in the correspondence
sense. If s is not quasi-true in A according to B, then s is said to be quasi-false in A
according to B.
Hence, in a report of a representational belief of the form 'belief that p', the
suggestion is that the sentence p should be regarded as partially or quasi- true in the
above sense, while the semi-propositional content of such beliefs is formally expressed
by the relevant partial structure which in representing our (partial) knowledge of the
domain concerned is the object of the belief. My claim is that by means of this
framework we can also accommodate the way in which the subject of the imaginative
endeavour is not homogeneous, is open-ended and can be regarded as quasi-true.
First of all, the distinction between ‘factual’ and representational’ belief nicely
meshes with invitations to imagine of the specific kind we are considering here and
with p understood in terms of such semi-propositional representations in the imagina-
tive context we can restore the connection between imagination and belief. Further-
more, the relevant ‘semi-propositional representation’, as formalized via a partial
structure, will contain various elements and as indicated above, is open-ended in that
it supports a range of propositional interpretations.
9 Back on the Imaginative Path
What about the claim that beliefs motivate action whereas imaginings do not, and are
effectively ‘quarantined’? It goes without saying that the imaginationmaymotivate action
in a broad sense but the claim has to do with the phenomenon whereby the attitudes
involved in an imagined state of affairs are typically not taken to be relevant to guiding
action in actuality (again see Liao and Gendler 2019 for further discussion). Nevertheless,
‘contagion’ may sometimes occur, as when the content of an imagining ends up shaping
our perceptions or beliefs in general (ibid.). And again the above framework would seem
able to accommodate this: consider Sperber’s ‘dragon’ case, for example. Here we can
speculate that the old man’s request that Sperber kill the purported dragon, understood in
terms of a semi-propositional representation, was motivated by some imagining or other,
itself conditioned by background knowledge, including certain traditional and cultural
beliefs. We can further extend this form of imaginative contagion to scientific cases, such
as Blondlot’s infamous but erroneous claim to have discovered ‘N-rays’ (see https://www.
aps.org/publications/apsnews/200708/history.cfm). Here we might suggest that
Blondlot’s imagining of ray-like phenomena, conditioned by the recent discovery of x-
rays, led him to ‘perceive’ such phenomena in his laboratory (see also Nye 1980). Again,
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the nature of the relevant belief in this case can be appropriately characterised as
‘representational’ in the above sense. Whether ‘contagious’ imaginings can play a more
positive role in science is a matter for another occasion but the point I wish to emphasise
here is that imaginingsmay not always be quarantined – and so this distinction from belief
may also be eroded – and that when they are not, the framework of semi-propositional
representations can also accommodate them.
That still leaves the claim that the relevant ‘imaginative path’ is not ‘belief- like’. We
recall that this is because, in fictional imaginings, at least, genre and symbolism
conspire to push us off such a belief-like path. Here we need to consider carefully
the extent, if any, to which these features can be carried over into science and whether,
if they can, the scientific imaginative path is such that either feature could compel us to
regard that path as not ‘belief-like’. As we’ll see, in the case of genre, we can answer
that it does not so compel us whereas when it comes to symbolism, it can be argued that
this cannot be carried over at all, at least not in the same form.
So, consider the way in which the ‘genre’ of a fictional work is supposed to take the
reader off the well-beaten inferential path associated with belief, as noted above. It does
this by means of the implicit assumptions associated with the genre: we don’t need
further justification why the chap with the elongated incisors bursts into flame in a
horror novel, for example. A particular genre introduces its own kinds of objects and
tropes – vampires and zombies, for example, or aliens and spaceships – together with
its own set of criteria for evaluating the veracity of claims about such objects. A given
genre is thus ‘self-authenticating’ in the sense that it provides its own criteria for what is
justifiable, although those criteria may be more or less flexible (compare, for example,
the zombies of The Walking Dead, comic and tv show, with those of the movie 28 Days
Later). Granted that, genres are typically stable over time, having developed their own
means of adjusting to changes and pressures, both internal and external.
With these characteristics in mind, we might usefully compare this notion of ‘genre’
with Crombie’s idea of ‘styles of reasoning’ in science, in the sense of distinctive ways
of scientific knowing that emerge at certain points in the history of science (Crombie
1994). He identified six, taken to be neither exclusive nor exhaustive: postulational,
experimental, hypothetical, taxonomic, probabilistic and statistical, and historical or
genetic. As with genre in fiction, such styles ‘hermeneutically reinforce’ our confidence
about what truths are implied but unstated in the relevant scientific practice. Hacking
then famously claimed that these styles introduced new kinds of objects and new
criteria for the truth or falsity of statements about those objects (for a comparative
analysis see Sciortino 2017). Furthermore, he argued, a given style is self-
authenticating in the sense that it defines its own criteria of validity and objectivity,
and it also develops its own techniques of stabilisation.
Finally, he insists that each style is grounded in our cognitive capacities that are the
product of both evolution and cultural development.
Apart from that last feature, there seems to be a straightforward comparison with the
outline of genres sketched above. The first of Hacking’s claims is obviously conten-
tious in the scientific context (for further consideration see Ruphy 2016)17 but perhaps
less so in that of literary genres, as already suggested. And both fictional genres fiction
17 A realist would of course insist that although such a ‘style of reasoning’ may offer new ways of describing
or conceptualising certain objects, it does not bring such objects into existence.
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and scientific ‘styles’ can be seen as self-authenticating and self-stabilising. What this
illuminates is that the more straightforward ‘imaginative path’ against which the
unfolding of imagination in fiction is compared may not be present in science either
and hence simply pointing to the existence of genre or styles of reasoning is not
sufficient to demonstrate that the relevant imagining is not ‘belief- like’. Indeed, if
such genres or styles are regarded, rather broadly perhaps, as constraints,18 then their
impact on the imaginative path might be less disruptive than initially thought –
certainly in the scientific case, at least.
In that case, that scientific beliefs are constrained or even shaped by appropriate
conventions or may be considered to be embodied in particular research programmes or
overarching theoretical frameworks and so on is, of course, hardly contentious. In the
relativistic case, for example, we might appeal to Lorentz invariance as the appropriate
constraint, in the context of the associated significance given to symmetry principles in
general. In the specific example of Einstein’s paper we might take the equivalent of
‘genre’ to be embodied in his adoption of what Crombie calls the ‘postulational’ style
as reflected in the way he presents the constancy of the speed of light, for example, as
already considered above, as well as in the commitment to Maxwellian electrodynam-
ics, with the various implicit truths thereby implied. Indeed, we have already noted that
the scientific imagination in general is constrained in various ways like this, together
with the role of background theoretical and experimental knowledge (Salis
forthcoming; Stuart forthcoming-b).19
When it comes to symbolism, on the other hand, and its role in disrupting the
‘imaginative path’, one might worry that this cannot be accommodated quite so straight-
forwardly. Recall the example from Jane Eyre, when Jane is locked in a red room, where
this meant to symbolise the womb, from which, in conjunction with other elements, we
are supposed to infer that she is affected by the loss of her mother. The claim is that two
kinds of thought are involved here – the imagining of Jane in the red room and the belief
that this is intended to symbolise the womb – but they do not come into direct inferential
contact, involving as they do different scenarios (Stock 2017, pp. 178-179).
However, it is not at all clear that we are ever expected to make such moves when it
comes to scientific practices. Consider another example from theworld of art, namely that of
‘vanitas’ paintings from theNetherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries. Therewe find certain
elements within the painting – typically a still-life of some sort – that are supposed to
symbolize the futility of life and the inevitably of our death, where these elements may be
explicit, such as skulls or skeletons, or less so, as in a lemon, half peeled, apparently standing
for time passing and the bitterness of life. Now, recent years have seen numerous attempts to
construct accounts of representation that are capable of embracing representation in both art
and science and within certain of those accounts such symbolic elements have been
accommodated, in one form or another. Thus, for example, Frigg and Nguyen’s influential
‘DEKI’ account incorporates the notion of a ‘key’ that, in effect, unpacks the relevant
18 Dubrow (1982) rejects the idea that genres have a deterministic impact, or that readers’ reaction to them can
be codified in an ‘if/then’ pattern; rather, she suggests a genre might be usefully compared to a human
personality, not least in displaying certain traits in different ways and in incorporating traits from different
personality types while still conforming to one such type (ibid., p. 117).
19 It has also been argued that some kinds of imaginative exercises do follow a certain kind of logic (Berto
2018). Having said that, such a ‘logic’ and the relevant constraints more generally should be understood as
context specific and not straightforwardly generalisable as norms (Stuart forthcomingb).
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symbol for us (Frigg and Nguyen 2017). In the case they examine – that of a painting of an
18th century noblewoman – it is the small dog in the picture that is ‘keyed up’ to represent
fidelity; in the example of the ‘vanitas’ paintings above it would obviously be the half-peeled
lemon towhich the relevant keywould apply.20 Obviously, the ‘shape’ of the key, as it were,
and the ability to unpack the symbolism will depend on a complex nexus of relevant
background knowledge, including certain cultural conventions and presuppositions (and in
such cases consideration of the relevant genre – still-life paintings for example – might be
relevant). So, in the case of a lemon, viewers of such a painting in the 17th century would
immediately appreciate that such a relatively exotic fruit, not native to the Netherlands, was
indicative of some degree of wealth (Sonneman 2012) and anyone who has tasted one,
whether in the 17th century or today, would appreciate the connection to bitterness!
Do we encounter anything along these lines when it comes to scientific theories or
models? It would seem not. This is not to suggest, of course, that science does not deal
with symbols. As with the words on the page in a work of fiction, certain marks in a
paper or book or on a whiteboard are taken to denote certain physical properties. But
typically what the symbol stands for here is given explicitly; so, in the case of
Einstein’s paper with which we began, we are told upfront that v stands for velocity.
More generally, it would seem that by virtue of not incorporating elements that are
‘keyed up’ in the above manner, scientific representations differ from artistic ones. In
other words, when it comes to texts like the 1905 paper, we don’t have features like that
of Jane Eyre’s ‘red room’ that require us to make this move of inferring a ‘hidden’
interpretation of some kind, based on some implicit understanding or social convention.
In this sense reading a scientific paper is different from reading certain works of fiction.
But then of course, the fact that such symbolic features are absent in the scientific case
simply means that this does not constitute an obstacle to taking imagination to follow a
‘belief-like path’ in this specific case (unlike in a fiction, say).21 This removes the
second obstacle to regarding imagination as ‘belief-like’.
Thus, with the idea that the ‘object’ of the imagining is a ‘semi- propositional
representation’ as sketched above, together with an understanding of the associated
attitude of belief as belief that such a representation is quasi-true, and an appreciation of
the relevant style of reasoning in play and any constraints, we have an appropriate
framework within which we can consider Einstein’s invitation to imagine as appropri-
ately ‘belief-like’, in line with what is presented in the rest of his paper. In other words,
the relevant passages appealing to the imagination can hence be considered as an
integral and important part of scientific practice as a whole, with regard to the epistemic
attitude that should be adopted.
10 Imagination and Knowledge
One might be tempted to go even further and argue, as Williamson does, that imagi-
nation also provides knowledge (Williamson 2016). In particular, it has been widely
20 As well as transience and the underlying bitterness of mortal life, lemons were also taken to represent
fidelity, apparently.
21 If an example from science were to be given that does exemplify this sort of move, I would argue that it
further demonstrates that imagination does play a significant role in theorising, just not the sort of ‘belief-like’
role that I am concerned with here.
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acknowledged that the exercise of imagination allows us to prepare for certain practi-
cally relevant possibilities. So, for example, prior to jumping across a stream, say, we
may imagine ourselves doing so, thereby preparing ourselves for the leap. Williamson
claims that such a capacity has obvious evolutionary advantages, and in order to confer
them, he suggests, it must be both selective and ‘reality oriented’ and must operate both
voluntarily and involuntarily, in which respect it resembles attention (ibid.). We can
choose to imagine succeeding in jumping across the stream, or failing, and in this
respect the exercise of the imagination is voluntary but having chosen a particular initial
condition, as it were, the unfolding of the consequences, along a particular imaginative
path, is involuntary of course (ibid.)
There is an immediate objection, however: insofar as this characterisation involves
only the raising of possibilities, imagination provides, at best, only ‘how- possibly’
knowledge (cf. Reutlinger et al. 2018). Thus, when it comes to science, at least, this
would encourage us to consign imagination to the context of discovery, or perhaps of
pursuit (see, for example, Nyrup forthcoming; also da Costa and French 2003 pp. 115-
129), rather than that of justification (Williamson 2016), as noted at the beginning of
this paper. Bracketed off in that way, it may well be belief-like in nature but it could not
be said to provide ‘how-actually’ knowledge. Nevertheless, Williamson argues, in the
scientific case, at least, such a bracketing collapses under the reliance of science on
mathematics, whose first principles are indeed justified via ‘unashamed appeals to the
imagination’ (ibid.).22 Thus he concludes, the role of imagination in justification seeps
through the body of science via the dependence on mathematics and hence it can be
regarded as providing ‘how-actually’ knowledge about the world.
This is clearly problematic, dependent as it is on a particular view of the foundations
of mathematics and its applicability to science. In response, one can argue that, even
granted the claim that mathematics does involve an ‘unashamed’ appeal to the imag-
ination, the relevant dependence of science on mathematics is such as to prevent any
such seepage. So, for example, if one were to maintain that mathematics plays only a
representational role in science (Saatsi 2011) such that it affords us a grasp on certain
physical dependencies (Strevens 2008) then any knowledge-via-imagination accruing
to the former cannot be taken to be passed on to the latter. Thus, the relevant knowledge
will be about the mathematics only, and not about the world.
At this point someone might gesture at two ways in which the mathematical intrudes
into the physical, allowing for one form of knowledge to blur into the other. The first
concerns what Wigner called the ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of mathematics in
physics (Wigner 1960), which might suggest some form of dependence between the
two that prevents us from drawing such a hard and fast distinction when it comes to
providing knowledge. However, the apparently unreasonable nature of this effective-
ness evaporates when we consider actual examples in all the relevant detail and note the
moves made to bring both the relevant mathematics and physical theory into contact
(Bueno and French 2018). The second concerns the purported role of mathematics in
explanation (see, for example, Baker 2009). Again, if it could be convincingly argued
22 The discovery-justification distinction is famously problematic of course and itself may be taken to collapse,
for entirely separate reasons. Indeed, it has been argued that the same epistemic attitude can be maintained
across both domains, namely that of belief in the theory as quasi-true in the above sense (da Costa and French
2003, Ch. 6).
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that mathematics plays an ineliminable role in explanations of physical phenomena,
then insofar as we have justifications of the relevant beliefs and the explanations are
factive, it could be concluded that the mathematics provides knowledge of the world.
However, such arguments can be undermined through, again, a closer examination of
the role played by the mathematics in specific cases (Saatsi 2011; Bueno and French
2018, Ch. 9) which reveals, again, that this is only representational; and so, again, this
conclusion can be resisted.
More generally, it has been argued that we need to supplement our imaginings on
any matter with certain background information and in particular when it comes to
scientific cases, recalling the previously noted point about constraints, relevant theo-
retical knowledge pertaining to the subject matter at hand (Spaulding 2016; Stuart
forthcoming-a and forthcoming-b). Imagination on its own cannot go beyond the ‘how-
possible’ to provide knowledge of the world (but then, neither of course can belief!).
In this context, the above distinction between how-possibly and how-actually
knowledge is reflected in Salis’ contrast between knowledge claims about the imagi-
nary system under consideration and knowledge claims about reality generated via the
imagination (Salis forthcoming). In the case of Einstein’s paper, the former pertain to
the possible behaviour of the (idealised) clocks and rods as set out in that paper and the
latter to the actual behaviour of actual clocks and rods as incorporated within concrete
physical systems. It is the latter, of course, that comes to be represented as evidence
about which we hold factual beliefs. Knowledge claims about imaginary set-ups play
an important role in helping to establish knowledge claims about reality, just as
mathematics does, but of course, the point remains, that such establishment is ultimate-
ly only achieved via engagement with reality, by means of observation (of some form
or other), say.
Thus, we can maintain that imagination in science is belief-like, in the above sense,
and in that sense is on a par with the other relevant elements of scientific practice in
general, without committing ourselves to the view that in and of itself, it provides
knowledge.
11 Final Remarks
Certainly there is more to say about the role of imagination in such practice and its
engagement with these other elements and forms of reasoning that are involved. My
intention here is primarily just to emphasise that it does play some such role and that it
can be situated within a unitary epistemic framework, namely one shaped by represen-
tational belief and the notion of quasi-truth. On the one hand, as already indicated, this
allows us to accommodate imagination within a framework that also captures other
features of scientific practice, such as models and idealisations, for example (da Costa
and French 2003). Furthermore, given the critical role that imagination is typically
taken to play in scientific creativity, such an accommodation may then be viewed as
placing the latter notion more centrally within the philosophy of science.
On the other hand, we might speculate that the above framework of representational
belief might be extended further into the epistemology of imagination itself. We recall
that Sperber’s notion of a ‘semi-propositional representation’ was originally proposed
to bring ‘into the fold’, as it were, apparently irrational beliefs, as in the case of the old
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man and the dragon. Consider also ‘pretense behaviour’ and the issue of how that
relates to belief (for a quick summary, see Liao and Gendler 2019): viewed from a
‘Sperberian’ perspective, we may see such behaviour in a new light that allows us to
sidestep the traditional division between regarding belief and imagination as existing on
a continuum and taking the latter as reducible to the former. Likewise, consider the
comparison between imagination and so-called ‘episodic’ memory (memory involving
mental content about one’s own past): how significant should we take the apparent
differences between the two (ibid.)?
Michaelian, for example, has recently argued that such memories are an evolution-
arily adaptive form of imagining, involving representations with content that goes
beyond that of past representations (Michaelian 2016). With remembering understood
as a kind of imaginative simulating on Michaelian’s account, the framework of semi-
propositional representations and quasi-truth may help alleviate certain concerns re-
garding such a constructivist approach. However, this is all to step well beyond the
issues touched on in this paper.
Finally, and returning to the latter issues, the role of the above kinds of invitations
and of imagination in general in papers like Einstein’s, and other examples of scientific
work, reveals that the set of practices involved in such work and our engagement with
those practices (through reading papers, listening to talks etc.) is more complex and
heterogeneous than it is often portrayed. Having said that, it is also noteworthy that we
can begin to make sense of that complexity and heterogeneity by productively
importing certain moves and devices from the philosophy of art into our considerations
of such practices within the philosophy of science, whilst also acknowledging the
differences between the two domains and the limitations of such devices. Although it is
not the case that all the features attributed to the imagination when it comes to fictions,
for example, can be straightforwardly carried over to scientific theories, the extent to
which we can draw on the former to illuminate the nature of the latter is significant and
suggests that the philosopher of science might profitably view the philosophy of art as
offering a useful set of tools to be appropriated and deployed in the service of a better
understanding of science (subject to relevant caveats, of course; see French 2020).
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and
indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the
article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Arcangeli, M. (2010). Imagination in Thought Experimentation. Sketching a Cognitive Approach to Thought
Experiments. In L. Magnani, W. Carnielli, & C. Pizzi (Eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and
Technology (pp. 571–587). Dordrecht: Springer.
Arcangeli, M. (2017). “Response to Only Imagine”, https://junkyardofthemind.com/blog/2017/10/12
/symposium-on-only-imagine-commentary-and-response. Accessed 12 May 2020.
Arcangeli, M. (2018). Supposition and the Imaginative Realm: A Philosophical Inquiry. London: Routledge.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2020) 10:27 Page 17 of 19    27 
Arcangeli, M., & Dokic, J. (2020). A Plea for the Sublime in Science. In M. Ivanova & S. French (Eds.), The
Aesthetics of Science: Beauty, Imagination and Understanding (pp. 104–124). London: Routledge.
Baker, A. (2009). Mathematical Explanation in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60,
611–633.
Berto, F. (2018). “Taming the Runabout Imagination Ticket.” Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-
1751-6
Bueno, O. (1997). Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science, 28, 585–610.
Bueno, O., & French, S. (2018). Applying Mathematics: Immersion, Inference and Interpretation. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Cohen, L. J. (1989). Belief and acceptance. Mind, 98, 367–389.
Crombie, A. C. (1994). Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition: The History of Argument and
Explanation Especially in the Mathematical and Biomedical Sciences. London: Duckworth.
Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
da Costa, N. C. A., & French, S. (1990). The model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science.
Philosophy of Science, 57, 248–265.
da Costa, N., & French, S. (2003). Science and Partial Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dubrow, H. (1982). Genre. London: Methuen Press.
Einstein, A. (1905). “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Korper”, Annalen derPhysik. 17: 891–921; English trans.:
‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’, Translation by G. B. Jeffery and W. Perrett in The Principle
of Relativity, London: Methuen and Company, Ltd. (1923).
Einstein, A. (1989), The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein: Volume 2: The Swiss Years: Writings, 1900-
1909 (English translation supplement). Princeton University Press.
Elgin, C. (2017). True Enough. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
French, S. (2020). There Are No Such Things As Theories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
French, S., and Vickers, P. (2011). “Are There No Such Things as Theories?”The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 62:771–804.
Frigg, R. (2010). Models and Fictions. Synthese, 172, 251–268.
Frigg, R., & Nguyen, J. (2017). Of Barrels and Pipes: Representation-as in Art and Science. In O. Bueno, G.
Darby, S. French, & D. Rickles (Eds.), Thinking About Science, Reflecting on Art (pp. 41–61). London:
Routledge.
Gendler, T. (2000). The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance. Journal of Philosophy, 97, 55–81.
Howard, D. (2017). “Einstein's Philosophy of Science.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/einstein-
philscience/>.
Illife, R. (2018). “Science Fictions: The Triumph of the Imagination and the Invention of Scientific
Creativity.” talk, Oxford Nov. 8 2018.
Langland-Hassan, P. (2015). Imaginative attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90, 664–
686.
Liao, S., & Gendler, T. (2019). “Imagination.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019
/entries/imagination/. Accessed 12 May 2020.
Meynell, L. (2014). Imagination and insight: a new acount of the content of thought experiments. Synthese,
191, 4149–4168.
Meynell, L. (2018). Images and imagination in thought experiments. In M. Stuart, Y. Fehige, & J. R. Brown
(Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments (pp. 498–511). London: Routledge.
Michaelian, K. (2016). Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Murphy, A. (forthcoming). “Towards a Pluralist Account of the Imagination in Science.”
Nye, M. J. (1980). N-rays: An episode in the history and psychology of science. Historical Studies in the
Physical Sciences, 11, 125–156.
Nyrup, R. (Forthcoming). “Of Water Drops and Atomic Nuclei: Analogies and Pursuit Worthiness in
Science”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Post, H. (1971). Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: In Praise of Conservative Induction. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, 2, 213–255.
Priest, G. (2006). In Contradiction (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reutlinger, A., Hangleiter, D., & Hartmann, S. (2018). Understanding (with) Toy Models. British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 69, 1069–1099.
   27 Page 18 of 19 European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2020) 10:27 
Ruphy, S. (2016). Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press.
Saatsi, J. (2011). The Enhanced Indispensability Argument: Representational versus Explanatory Role of
Mathematics in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, 143–154.
Salis, F. (Forthcoming-a). “Knowledge Through Scientific Imagination.”\
Salis, F. & Frigg R. (Forthcoming-b). "Capturing the Scientific Imagination." In The Scientific Imagination:
Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, ed. Peter Godfrey-Smith and Arnon Levy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Schindler, S. (2018). Theoretical virtues in science: uncovering reality through theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Sciortino, L. (2017). On Ian Hacking’s Notion of Style of Reasoning. Erkenntnis, 82, 243–264.
Shapere, D. (1969). Notes toward a post-positivistic interpretation of science. In P. Achinstein & S. F. Barker
(Eds.), The Legacy of Logical Positivism (pp. 115–160). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Sonneman, T. (2012). Lemon: A Global History. London: Reaktion Books.
Sorensen, R. (2013). Veridical Idealizations. In M. Frappier, L. Meynall, & J. R. Brown (Eds.), Thought
Experiments in Philosophy, Science and the Arts (pp. 30–52). New York: Routledge.
Spaulding, S. (2016). Imagination Through Knowledge. In A. Kind & P. Kung (Eds.), Knowledge Through
Imagination (pp. 207–226). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sperber, D. (1982). Apparently Irrational Beliefs. In M. Hollis & S. Lukes (Eds.), Rationality and Relativism
(pp. 149–180). Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
Strevens, M. (2008). Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Stuart, M. (2017). Imagination: A Sine Qua Non of Science. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 9–32.
Stuart, M. (Forthcoming-a). “Towards a Dual Process Epistemology of Imagination.” Synthese. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11229-019-02116-w.
Stuart, M. (Forthcoming-b). “The Productive Anarchy of Scientific Imagination.” Philosophy of Science.
Stock, K. (2017). Only Imagine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Todd, C. (2020). Imagination, Aesthetic Feelings, and Scientific Reasoning. In M. Ivanova & S. French
(Eds.), The Aesthetics of Science: Beauty, Imagination and Understanding (pp. 63–85). London:
Routledge.
Toon, A. (2012). Models as Make-Believe. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Weinberg, J., & Meskin, A. (2006). Puzzling Over the Imagination…. In S. Nichols (Ed.), The Architecture of
Imagination (pp. 175–202). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weisberg, M. (2013). Simulation and Similarity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wigner, E. P. (1960). The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.
Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, 13, 1–14.
Williamson, T. (2016). Knowing by Imagining. In A. Kind & P. Kung (Eds.), Knowledge Through
Imagination (pp. 113–123). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2020) 10:27 Page 19 of 19    27 
